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The work described in this report was performed by the Propulsion
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ABSTRACT
A preliminary failure mode, failure effect, and criticality ana-
lysis (FMECA) of the major subsystems of nuclear electric propulsion (NEP)
is presented. Simplified reliability block diagrams (RBDs) are also given.
A computer program, developed at JPL, was used to calculate the reliability
of the heat rejection subsystem.
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I. SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The reliability of a system is the probability that it can successfully
fulfill its intended mission in a given time when operated under specified
conditions. The objective of reliability analysis is to help make this proba-
bility of success as large as possible, within the limitations imposed by
weight and cost. Two opposite approaches (forward and backward) to relia-
bility analysis may be applied. In the forward approach, an overall system
reliability goal is established. Subsystem and component reliabilities are
allocated accordingly and expanded into a reliability tree. The salient fea-
ture of this forward approach is that engineering design must meet stringent
reliability requirements, which, of course, implies stringent requirements
on specifications, materials, and the quality of engineering technology.
Since all reasonable programs are cost-constrained, however, it is often
unrealistic to insist on achieving a reliability objective set for a particular
component or subsystem.
In the backward approach, the reliability of each component is esti-
mated based on available performance data and engineering judgment. This
gives a realistic estimation of the reliability which can be achieved for a
certain component. Unacceptably low reliability components are identified,
and efforts to improve these components can then be implemented. In case
of insufficient data to estimate component reliability, an acceptable relia-
bility can be specified. Then that component is designed and developed to
the specified reliability.
Reliability analysis contributes significantly to system reliability
through the process of identifying sources and causes of unreliability and
subsequent design modifications. Reliability analysis should begin right
after the proposed design starts. Some problems can be eliminated before
they arise, and some can even be solved at an early stage when design
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modification can be made without causing large increases in cost. Negligence
of the importance of early reliability analysis will probably cause extraordi-
nary, high cost effor ts later.
A simplified block diagram of reliability analysis during the design
phase is shown in Fig. 1.
As soon as the proposed design is conceived, the reliability engineer
should start reliability analysis. He can study the failure modes and effects
of each component, analyze the criticality of each failure mode, and then
make overall reliability computations. The information required by the
reliability engineer must come either from test results of the designed com-
ponent or a similar component used on previous missions.
Failure mode and effect analysis is the procedure for considering,
qualitatively, different failure modes during operation of components and
the effects these failure modes have on other components, subsystems, or
system operation and, hence, on mission success. At this stage, modes of
failure of lower-level elements are identified and their effects on the com-
ponents noted. The likelihood of component failure and the mode of failure
are inputs to the reliability prediction logic model. Experience with the
components during developmental testing, or experience with similar com-
ponents in other applications, provides the basis for evaluating the likelihood
of failure in various modes of operation. Great care must be exercised to
be sure that all possible failure modes and effects are identified and described.
Some failure modes result from simultaneous failure of more than one com-
ponent and must also be included in the analysis.
Criticality analysis is a quantitative procedure of identifying the cata-
strophic failure mode and estimating the degree of severity by considering
failure data, failure mode frequency ratio, and environmental stress factors.
A number, preferably in failures per million hours, is thus obtained for the
critical part or component from which the system reliability is calculated.
Reliability computations of the system can be made from knowledge of
the behavior of the components. The computed reliability of the system may
suggest that either a redesign or a more refined and updated analysis tech-
nique is required. Another technique would be to increase reliability of a
part or component by truncating material strength distribution or application
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stress distribution or both through proof load and material test. The
truncation eliminates some potential failures and hence increases the relia-
bility (Ref. 1). Physical constraints, costs, schedules, and parametric
trade studies become important considerations in this process . If the relia-
bility requirement for a system greatly exceeds the. predicted value, an
entirely different design concept, functional approach, or redundancy scheme
may then be examined. In selection among alternatives to achieve a given
level of reliability, the cost must be kept at a minimum. Examination of
different schemes should be repeated until there is no great difference
between predicted and required reliability and the cost is minimum.
One important aspect of reliability analysis during the design phase is
that the reliability analysis should serve as a tool of parameter study for
component/subsystem tradeoffs . Regarding thermionic converter networks,
for example, reliability is one of the most important parameters to be con-
sidered in selecting s eries-parallel connections.
Emphasis here is placed on failure modes and effects analysis." For
each of the major subsystems of nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), a failure
mode and effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) and greatly simplified
reliability block diagrams (RBDs) are given. Detailed and sophisticated
FMECA and RED are impossible at this stage.
To estimate NEP system reliability, arbitrary reliability f igures for
NEP subsystems were assigned, and system reliability was computed as
shown in Table 1. The overall reliabilities obtained seem low. It is clear
from Fig. 2 that any system with more than a few components in series has
a low reliability unless each of the series component reliabilities is in the
range of 0.995 or greater.
II. PRELIMINARY FAILURE MODE, FAILURE EFFECT, AND
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY BLOCK
DIAGRAMS OF NEP SYSTEM
A preliminary failure mode, failure effect, and criticality analysis
(FMECA) is given in this section. A reliability block diagram (RBD) for
each of the subsystems is also included. A quantitative criticality analysis
should be implemented whenever sufficient failure data, failure mode fre-
quency ratio, and environmental stress factors are available.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629
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A. System Definition
The reference NEP system/spacecraft is of s ide-thrust configuration
and is shown in Fig. 3. The NEP system consists mainly of a thrust sub-
system and a power subsystem. The power subsystem consists mainly of a
120-kWe, 20, 000 equivalent full power hours (EFPH) thermionic reactor, a
heat-rejection subsystem, and a nuclear shield. The thrust subsystem con-
sists mainly of 18 30-cm ion thrusters and 36 power conditioning units.
(The number of components and other data given here are for reference
purposes and do not imply a. final design.)
B. Classification of Criticality
At this stage, only qualitative criticality analysis is possible. The
criticality of a component is classified according to the following criteria:
Class I: Catastrophic failure of the NEP system occurs in a relatively
short time. If this critical failure mode of a component
takes place, the mission is impossible to accomplish.
Class II: Performance characteristics of the subsystem and/or system
may be changed. If sufficient redundancy is available or
. degradation of performance is not significant, the mission
can still be completely successful. If performance degrada-
tion is within certain limits, the mission may be achieved
partially.
Class III: Effect on system and/or the mission is small and negligible;
performance may degrade but not below design value.
C. Reactor Subsystem
The reactor subsystem is composed of a thermionic reactor and its
auxiliary control elements, a LiH neutron shield, and miscellaneous struc-
tures. The reactor consists of 162 thermionic fuel elements (TFEs),
arranged in six full hexagonal rings with six additional TFEs per side in the
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seventh ring and 18 radial reflectors which are movable in pairs by nine
stepping motors. Each TFE consists of six series-connected flashlight
converters sharing a common cesium reservoir and an electrical heater.
The emitter is of tungsten and operates at about 1900 K. The collector is
of niobium and operates at about 1100 K. The converter efficiency is about
11% . The coolant, NaK, enters the core at 975 K and leaves the core at
1075 K, carrying the waste heat to the heat rejection subsystem. Neutron
detectors and ion chambers are used to measure the neutron flux and the
power level and feed signals to the automatic control mechanism. The reac-
tivity is controlled by the rotation of the radial reflector drums, which are
made of BeO. Each pair of the reflectors is to be driven by one motor.
The design maximum thermal power plant output is 1840 kWe. A single TFE
is expected to produce 800-1000 kWe at 5.5-6 V. The total reactor lifetime
is expected to be more than 50, 000 h.
Table 2 presents the preliminary FMECA of the reactor subsystem;
Fig. 4 shows its RED. Note in Fig. 4 that some blocks should be expanded
into more detail whenever the detailed design is consolidated.
D. Thrust Subsystem
The thrust subsystem is composed of 18 30-cm-diameter mercury
electron bombardment ion thrusters, 36 power conditioning units (PCU) to
convert the power output from the thermionic reactor into suitable power
for the thrusters, eight gimbal actuators, and two translator actuators with
carriage and translator rods, one thruster array structure (TAS) for mount-
ing the ion thrusters, two propellant (Hg) storage tanks which also serve a
major role as gamma radiation shielding, and the auxiliary propellant-feed
system components. Some of the thrusters are provided as active standby
such that partial failure is allowed to occur without loss of the thrust or
thrust vector control capability.
The FMECA of the thrust subsystem is given in Table 3; the RED is
shown in Fig. 5. Again, some blocks should be expanded when detailed
design is available.
E. Heat Rejection Subsystem
The heat rejection subsystem is a large and important part of the
propulsion system which justifies a separate FMECA. First, any
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629
Table 2. FMECA of reactor subsystem
Component
Reactor vessel
Thermionic
fuel element
(TFE)
Radial
ref lec tor
d rum and
control
Neutron
detector , ion
chambe r and
ments
Cesium reser-
vo i r and hea te r ,
ces him passage
Fiss ion gas
vent and s tor -
age chamber
cable
Aux i l i a ry
power
condi t ioner
LiH shield
Batteries
Function
entire system; confinement of
f iss ion products and vent path
for f iss ion gas .
Lockout of the reflectors,
dur ing launching; moving the
re f l ec to r drums to change the
n e u t r o n leakage rate and to
control the react iv i ty of the
reactor .
up and c o n t r o l l i n g of r eac to r
Main ta in ing optimal operating
condit ion for conve r t e r .
Vent ing of the f iss ion gas in the
fue l e lement to al leviate fue l
swelling; conf inement of f i ss ion
gas in the s torage chamber
1 1
as reactor cont ro l , cesium
heater , etc .
Reducing the in tegra ted neu t ron
flux to an acceptable level to
the science i n s t r u m e n t .
Supplying the s t a r tup power for
the reactor.
Fai lure modes
(a) Weld f a i lu re ,
(b) Corrosion or deterioration of
vessel material,
(c) Seal f a i l u r e at TFE penetra-
tions in vessel head.
(b) Emi t t e r / co l l ec to r insu la tor
breakdown,
(c) Sheath or cladding mecha-
nical f a i l u r e ,
(d) Open c i rcu i t of i n t e rna l
(a) Spiral spring or locking
(b) Electr ical w i r ing fa i lu re in
the stepper motor ,
{c) Bea r ing f a i l u r e ,
(d) Shaft f r a c t u r e .
.
damage.
(a) Meteoroid p u n c t u r e of the
fb) Heater breakdown,
(c) Blockage or leakage of cesium
path.
(a) Blockage of f i s s i o n gas palh.
{b) Meteoroid p u n c t u r e damage
on f i s s i o n gas s to rage chamber
or other kind of leakage.
(b) Wi re f a i lu re .
(a) Excess ive neu t ron - and
gamma-induced hea t ing .
(b) Crack or void in the shield.
Open or shor t c i r c u i t .
Fa i lure effects
(a) Loss of coolant in the core
leading to melt ing down of the
reactor or shutdown of the power
plant.
ef fec t at all if corros ion wi th in
tolerance,
(c) Same as (a).
collector and local coolant tem-
p e r a t u r e may r ise, but wi th in
tolerance.
of par t ia l power of a TFE.
r i s ing , d e t e r i o r a t i n g the ce l l ,
(d) Loss of 1/2 power of one
TFE.
fa) Unsafe for l aunching; spiral
s p r i n g f a i l u r e a f t e r launch
a f f e c t i n g the control of the
reac to r ,
(b) The r e f l ec to r sc ramming
d u r i n g the s t a r t u p phase; loss
of r e a c t i v i t y control a f t e r
s t a r t u p .
(c) Degradat ion of pe r fo rmance
of r e f l e c t o r control .
(d) Loss of control on one pa i r
of r e f l e c to r s .
Loss of power leve l con t ro l .
(a) Loss of cesium and (b) .
of conver t e r .
(c) Same as (a) and (b).
(a | Excessive f u e l swel l ing,
d e g r a d i n g pe r for mane e of
conve r t e r .
(b) On-board rad ia t ion
e n v i r o n m e n t worsening.
(a) Shor t c i r c u i t ,
(b) Open c i r c u i t .
(a) A u x i l i a r y power cond i t i one r
p e r f o r m a n c e .
tor control ; power plant shu tdown .
(a) Thermal s t r e s s .
(b) I nc rea s ing hydrogen evolut ion
n e u t r o n f lux at payload.
(c ) M i s s i o n f a i l u r e .
Prevent s t a r tup of the power
plant.
Cr i t i ca l i ty
(a) Class I.
(b) Class III.
(c) Class I.
(a) Class III.
(b) Class 11.
(c) Class II.
(d) Class II.
fa) Clas* 1, or 11.
(b) Class I or II.
(c) , (d) Class II.
Note: Severe env i ron -
tu re and high radiat ion.
Class II or I.
(a) (b) (c) Class II.
(a) (b) Class II.
(a), (b) Class II.
(a) Class 11.
(b) Class II or I.
(a) Class III.
(b) Class II.
(c) Class I.
Class I.
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loss -of-coolant incident in the reactor core would lead to complete mission
failure. Second, severe degradation of a single cell of any TFE due to
improper cooling may propagate to other cells and possibly lead to a com-
plete shutdown of the thermionic reactor power plant in a relatively short
time.
This subsystem consists of approximately 2500 heat pipes, including
necessary redundancy, which are brazed to three NaK coolant headers, an
EM pump with dual windings which circulates the NaK coolant, and two ac-
cumulators, which compensate for the volumetric change of the coolant due
to temperature variations. Each accumulator consists of a gas-pressurized
bellow and a concentric passive cylindrical tank which serves as secondary
containment such that if any mechanical failure of the bellow occurs, loss
of coolant would be prevented by the tank.
The heat rejection subsystem FMECA and RED are shown in Table 4
and Fig. 6, respectively.
III. RELIABILITY MODELING AND COMPUTER PROGRAM
A. Reliability Modeling
Some basic reliability models (Refs . 3-7) are presented as follows:
" (a) n series configuration with constant failure rate \. (independent
components). The reliability of this configuration is
rv
(b) n parallel configuration'with constant failure rate X. (no switch-
ing or perfect switching). The reliability of this configuration is
n
R = 1 - Pf (1 - e"V)
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(c) Two identical units (one standby) with a failure rate Xn while
operating and A. while in dormant state
-V xo f -V - . ^o+MR = e H I e - e
(d) n identical and independent units, allowing m unit failure without
causing serious degradation
-\t n-i
R =
* l' * '
n=m
Example of application area: heat pipes in heat rejection
subsystem.
(e) n-1 standby units which cannot fail until operated and with a
switching failure rate X
i=0
In formulas (a) through (e) it is assumed that the causes of fail-
ure are all external to the element and unrelated to previous use.
However, if the failure rate should be changing with time, a
more flexible distribution, such as a generalized Weibull distri-
bution (Ref. 8), is required.
(f) A configuration with W series of N parallel units supported by
M spares in dormancy.
(NW\)M M-l -NWXy
 D tt_ . W ,R =
 - - y - e ^ - ^ d y
/ M-l -NWXyy e dy
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in which y is the time, assuming a gamma distribution, at which
the last spare unit has been consumed and RN is the reliability
of the N parallel units .
Example of application area of formula (e) and (f): thrusters in
the thrust subsystem.
(g) Simulation (Monte Carlo method): an analogous stochastic proc-
ess to simulate the random failure and wearout failure of a
complex system. Example of application area: converter net-
work in the reactor subsystem.
B. Reliability Computer Program
Reliability calculation can be handled by analytical probability theory
if the system configuration is not complex in the sense of a reliability block
diagram. For calculation of the reliability of a system consisting of a
complex combination of dormant and/or active redundancy with imperfect
switch function, a computer program has been developed at JPL (Ref. 9).
Two computer subroutines are also established to calculate the survival
probability of heat pipes and other piping due to meteoroid puncture and the
probability of expected number of survivors from "n" identical active redun-
dant elements, respectively.
A reliability block diagram computation program was developed by
Chelson and Eckstein at JPL. It is useful in handling active/standby com-
binations of redundancies, including the effects of imperfect switching in any
standby redundancy. As an exemplified application of the program, assume
we want to know the reliability of a heat rejection subsystem for a 20, 000-h
operation, given the failure rates of each component. The reliability of a
NEP heat rejection subsystem for a 20, 000-h mission is estimated by apply-
ing the computer programs. The heat rejection subsystem reliability block
diagram is shown in Fig. 6.
The X's are the element failure rate as the number of failures occur-
ring in one million hours. Block 1 represents the heat pipes of the radiator;
2341 out of 2496 heat pipes must be operating at end of mission (about 6. 3%
redundancy). The failure rates X, and X1 . are calculated based on heat pipe
and header meteoroid puncture probability. Blocks 2 and 3 represent two
active redundant EM pumps. Blocks 4 through 7 represent two series-of- two
12 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629
active redundant accumulators (the heat rejection subsystem fails if both
in-parallel accumulators fail). Blocks 8 through 13 represent the three
headers of the radiator. It is assumed that in one out of three headers NaK
coolant flow is allowed to be blocked (flow stoppage but no leaks) without
causing mission failure. Block 14 is incorporated separately for the three
headers in the reliability block diagram, considering the catastrophic failure
mode due to meteoroid puncture. Block 15 represents all the other piping
of the subsystem. Failure rates X~ through \. , and \ are estimatedLJ i j ID
(Ref. 10). Equal failure rates are assumed for identical components. Based
on the above, the reliability of the heat rejection subsystem is calculated to
be 0. 99577 for 20,000 h. Table 5 presents part of the computer output; it
shows the calculated reliability for each block (which represents the critical
function of a component) and the overall subsystem reliability.
IV. APPROACH TO NEP SYSTEM RELIABILITY COMPUTATION
A. Definition of Success of Mission
System reliability computation demands a clear-cut definition of sys-
tem success. Without this guideline, it is difficult to evaluate the unrelia-
bility of subsystems and components. For example, suppose the LiH
shielding cracked because of overheating during the mission propulsion
phase and allowed higher doses at the science equipment. However, suffi-
cient scientific data was received from the spacecraft to satisfy the mission
objectives. Then we can say that the shielding reliability is 1, because the
crack did not affect the return of mission data and thus the mission was
successful.
B. Mean-Time to Failure
Mean-time to failure (MTTF) for each component is required for com-
putation of reliability of a nonmaintainable system such as NEP. Several
failure-rate data sources will provide some of the needed information. In
addition, a plan for testing will be required for some elements of subsystems,
such as heat pipes, TFE, etc. Tests should be designed to give the best
estimate of the reliability of elements. Environmental conditions for all
the elements should be specified and used in estimating MTTF for the
mission.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629 13
Table 5. Reliability of the heat rejection subsystem
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
Block 7
Block 8
Block 9
Block 10
Block 11
Block 12
Block 13
Block 14
Block 15
Reliability
Active F/R
. 5000000-10
. 3000000-06
. 3000000-06
.4000000-07
.4000000-07
.4000000-07
.4000000-07
. 2100000-06
. 2100000-06
. 2100000-06
. 2100000-06
. 2100000-06
.2100000-06
. 5500000-10
. 2100000-06
Dormant F/R R-Initial Reliability
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
.0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
.0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
. 0000000
of the heat rejection subsystem through
. 9999990+000
. 9940180+000
.9940180+000
. 9992003+000
. 9992003+000
. 9992003+000
. 9992003+000
. 9958088+000
. 9958088+000
. 9958088+000
. 9958088+000
. 9958088+000
. 9958088+000
. 9999989+000
. 9958088+000
20000. hours = . 99577
C. Variance Analysis and Reliability Engineer
If both distributions of the material strength and the stress under var-
ious environmental conditions that a component will experience through an
entire mission are known, the probability of failure of that component can be
calculated. Assume the performance of that component is Y, which relates to
n variables X., such as temperature, pressure , etc. We can then express
the performance of a component as a function of these variables:
Y = f Xn>
and the variance (r as
14 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629
where <r. is the variance associated with x., and p.. is the degree of depen-
dence between variables x. and x. (Ref . 11). If the variables are statistically
independent, then p.. = 0.
Through the variance analysis, the variance which contributes most to
the unreliability of that component can be determined. Efforts can then be
concentrated on work to reduce that particular variance and hence increase
the reliability.
In order to have an efficient and realistic estimate of reliability during
the design and development phase, the reliability engineer should be involved
in design and development testing, and should be informed of any system
modifications or change. Through this involvement, he will have an under-
standing of each component failure mode, its effects and criticality, and a
best estimate of NEP system reliability for the entire mission.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-629 15
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1/45
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1/450
1/900
1/1350
1/1800
PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE
PROBABILITIES OF
FAILURE OF COM-
PONENTS FOR
ATTAINING 80%
EQUIPMENT
RELIABILITY
50 COMPONENTS
99 98 97
COMPONENT RELIABILITY, %
Fig. 2. Reliability of a system as a function of varying numbers of
components (from Ref. 11)
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RADIATOR
REACTOR
THRUSTERS
Hg TANK
SPACECRAFT
POWER COND
UNITS (PCU'S)
Fig. 3. NEP system/spacecraft, side thrust concept
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